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ABSTRACT: The subject’s perspective objection (SPO) is an objection against externalist 
theories of justification, warrant, and knowledge. In this article, I show that externalists 
can accommodate the SPO while remaining externalist. So, even if the SPO is successful, 
it does not motivate internalism, and the primary motivation for internalism has been 
lost. After this, I provide an explanation for why so many people find cases that motivate 
the SPO convincing. 
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1. Introduction 
The subject’s perspective objection (SPO) is commonly used to motivate internalist 
theories of justification; indeed, Michael Bergmann portrays it as the main reason 
for endorsing internalism.1 Variations of the SPO have appeared in, for example, 
Laurence Bonjour,2 Keith Lehrer,3 Paul Moser,4 and Bruce Russell.5 In this article, I 
explain internalism, externalism, and the SPO. Next, I show that one can 
accommodate the SPO while remaining an externalist, meaning that the SPO 
doesn’t motivate internalism. Therefore, the main motivation for internalism has 
been lost, and the case for internalism is substantially weakened. After this I show 
that the SPO rests on a false premise, and hence does not threaten externalism. 
                                                        
1 See Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
2 Laurence Bonjour, “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 5, 1980: 53-73 and Laurence Bonjour The Structure of Empirical Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
3 Keith Lehrer, Theories of Knowledge (Nashville: Westview Press 1990) and Keith Lehrer 
“Proper Function and Systematic Coherence,” in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays 
in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge, ed. Jonathan Kvanvig (Pennsylvania: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1996): 25-45.  
4 Paul Moser, Empirical Justification (Dordrecht Holland: D. Reidel, 1985). 
5 Bruce Russell, “The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses," European 
Journal of Philosophy of Religion 10, 3 (2018): 105-131. 
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Finally, I provide a diagnosis for why people find the cases that motivate the SPO 
convincing. 
2. The Subject’s Perspective Objection 
In epistemology, internalism and externalism are the dominant positions.6 
Internalists hold, roughly, that if S is justified in believing p, then S is (actually or 
potentially) aware of what justifies her belief that p. Externalists deny this: 
externalists hold that S can be justified in believing that p even if she isn’t (actually 
or potentially) aware of what justifies her belief that p. Many have objected to 
externalism on the grounds that if S is not (actually or potentially) aware of what 
justifies her belief then, even if it meets externalist conditions for justification, the 
truth of it will appear accidental to her. However, if S’s belief appears accidentally 
true to her, then she isn’t justified in believing it. Hence, externalism is false and 
we should endorse internalism.  
Laurence Bonjour, perhaps the most famous proponent of this style of 
objection, uses the following story to motivate internalism: 
NORMAN: Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a 
completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He 
possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility 
of such a cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day 
Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has 
no evidence either for or against his belief. In fact the belief is true and results 
from his clairvoyant power under circumstances in which it is completely 
reliable.7 
In NORMAN, externalist conditions for justification are met, yet Norman 
lacks justification. Hence, externalism is false. As Bonjour tells the story, we are 
supposed to understand Norman as not having positive reasons to doubt that 
veracity of his belief; he doesn’t have a defeater for his belief.8 However, just one 
page later, Bonjour suggests that  
[I]t becomes quite difficult to understand what Norman himself thinks is going 
on. From his standpoint, there is apparently no way in which he could know the 
President’s whereabouts...Why isn’t the mere fact that there is no way, as far as 
                                                        
6 Though, they are not exhaustive. Michael Bergmann argues that a position he calls ‘mentalism’ 
is neither internalist nor externalist. That said, I will treat the positions as exhaustive in this 
article. See Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006). 
7 Bonjour, The Structure, 41. 
8 Bonjour, The Structure, 40-41. 
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he knows, for him to have obtained [information about the president] sufficient 
reason for classifying this belief as an unfounded hunch and ceasing to accept it?9 
So, Bonjour asks us to understand Norman’s belief as being akin to an 
unfounded hunch. If we are to think of Norman’s belief as being akin to an 
unfounded hunch, then it seems that we are attributing to Norman a psychological 
property, namely the psychological property of his belief appearing to him as an 
unfounded hunch.10 
There is textual evidence for interpreting Bonjour in this way: he says that 
“[f]rom [Norman’s] subjective perspective, it is an accident that the belief is true.”11 
In other words, the belief appears to Norman to be accidentally true.12 Thus, it 
appears that a (negative) psychological property, that of appearing accidentally 
true, accompanies Norman’s belief. However, if a belief appears accidentally true to 
a person, then she has a defeater for her belief (more on this later), and this 
explains why NORMAN threatens externalism: externalist conditions for 
justification obtain yet his belief is defeated and therefore unjustified. But this 
explicitly conflicts with Bonjour’s urging that we should understand everything 
from Norman’s perspective to be just fine; he doesn’t want us to understand 
Norman as having a defeater. It appears, therefore, that Bonjour is inconsistent in 
his portrayal of Norman. What should we do here? I suggest that we understand 
Bonjour as saying that Norman does indeed have a defeater. This is because 
Norman’s belief appearing accidentally true to him is what does the work in 
NORMAN: if Norman’s belief doesn’t appear accidentally true to him, then it’s not 
at all clear that NORMAN is a counterexample to externalism or motivates 
internalism.13 
Another advantage of this interpretation is that it fits well with other, 
similar objections to externalism, such as Lehrer’s Mr. Truetemp case.14 Mr. 
Truetemp has, unbeknownst to him, a device implanted in him that produces 
                                                        
9 Bonjour, The Structure, 42. 
10 An unfounded hunch differs from other beliefs in how it feels: it feels like a hunch, as opposed 
to a normal belief. 
11 Bonjour, The Structure, 43. 
12 This interpretation is forced on us by the fact that Bonjour connects the accidental appearance 
of Norman’s belief to his subjective perspective.  
13 Bonjour says “[h]ow [can external conditions] justify Norman’s belief? From his subjective 
perspective, it is an accident that the belief is true. And the suggestion here is that the rationality 
or justifiability of Norman’s belief should be judged from Norman’s own perspective.” (The 
Structure, 42-43) This strongly suggests that the appearance of accidentality, which is a defeater 
for Norman, is what does the work in NORMAN.  
14 Lehrer, “Proper Function.” 
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accurate beliefs about the temperature in such a way that externalist conditions for 
justification are satisfied. However, Lehrer says, Mr. Truetemp “has no idea 
whether [his belief about the temperature] is correct and he is totally mystified by 
the existence of it,”15 and hence externalist conditions for justification are 
insufficient: Mr. Truetemp’s mystification acts as a defeater for his belief, making it 
unjustified.16 Lehrer’s basic point appears to be the same as Bonjour’s: if only 
externalist conditions for justification are met, the subject’s belief will appear 
accidental, and this defeats her belief, making it unjustified. 
Michael Bergmann has usefully summarized the above style of objection as 
follows: 
The Subject’s Perspective Objection (SPO): If [a] the subject holding a belief isn’t 
aware of what that belief has going for it, then [b] she isn’t aware of how its status 
is any different from a stray hunch or an arbitrary conviction. [c] From that we 
may conclude that from her perspective it is an accident that her belief is true. 
And that implies that it isn’t a justified belief.17 
[a] is just a case in which internalist conditions of justification don’t obtain, [b] is 
what Bonjour (and Lehrer) assert follows from [a], and [c], thinks Bonjour (and 
Lehrer), follows from [b]. So, the SPO maps onto what Bonjour is arguing with 
NORMAN and the inferences he makes. Thus, I will treat the SPO as representative 
of NORMAN (as well as Mr. Truetemp and other similar cases). The SPO, according 
to Bergmann, is the main motivation for internalism. So, if it can be shown that it 
doesn’t actually motivate internalism, then internalism is in trouble. In what 
follows, I will try to show just this. 
3. An Externalist Solution to the SPO 
So, the main motivation for internalism about justification is the SPO. In this 
section, I will argue that the SPO doesn’t support internalism; rather, it merely 
supports a no-defeaters condition (explained below). As we saw above, part of the 
SPO, namely [c], is the claim that S’s belief appears accidentally true, and this, 
claims the SPO, implies that the belief is not justified. We may put this as:  
ACCIDENT: If S’s belief that p appears accidentally true to S, then she has a 
defeater for p. 
                                                        
15 Lehrer, “Proper Function,” 32, emphasis mine. 
16 For other similar examples, see Lehrer, Theories of Knowledge, Moser, Empirical Justification, 
and Russell, “The Problem." 
17 Bergmann, Justification, 12. 
The Subject’s Perspective Objection to Externalism and Why it Fails 
327 
ACCIDENT threatens externalist theories of justification. This is because, 
according to the SPO, if only externalist conditions for justification are satisfied by 
S, the truth of her beliefs will appear accidental and hence will be defeated. And 
this means that her beliefs are unjustified.  
While ACCIDENT is not incontestable, I will grant its truth here to see 
where it takes us. Does ACCIDENT conflict with externalism? Not obviously. What 
is required to avoid the trouble brought about by ACCIDENT is the following 
thesis: 
NO DEFEATERS: S’s belief that p is justified only if S does not have any 
(undefeated) defeaters for her belief that p.  
So, the SPO entails ACCIDENT, and ACCIDENT shows that the correct theory of 
justification must be able to accommodate NO DEFEATERS. Therefore, if the SPO 
motivates internalism, it must be that in order to satisfy NO DEFEATERS, S must be 
aware of that which justifies her belief that p (i.e. it must be that only internalism 
can accommodate NO DEFEATERS). But, of course, S doesn’t need to be aware of 
that which justifies her belief in order to satisfy NO DEFEATERS; to not have a 
defeater for p, S needs to lack a mental state (whatever belief of hers is acting as a 
defeater for p), not have a mental state (i.e. an awareness of that which justifies her 
belief that p).  
It should be clear, then, that externalism is compatible with, can 
accommodate, NO DEFEATERS. To illustrate this, suppose one is a proper 
functionalist about justification: 
PROPER FUNCTIONALISM: S is justified in her belief that p if and only if (i) 
S believes p, (ii) p is true, (iii) S’s belief that p was produced by properly 
functioning cognitive faculties that are successfully aimed at producing true 
beliefs, and (iv) S is situated in an appropriate cognitive environment.18 
For the adherent of PROPER FUNCTIONALISM to accommodate NO 
DEFEATERS, she need only add the following condition to PROPER 
FUNCTIONALISM: 
(v) S does not have any (undefeated) defeaters for her belief that p. 
                                                        
18 For statements and defenses of PROPER FUNCTIONALISM, see Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and 
Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The 
Current Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Alvin Plantinga, Warranted 
Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), Bergmann, Justification, and 
Kenneth Boyce and Alvin Plantinga, “Proper Functionalism,” in The Continuum Companion to 
Epistemology, ed. Andrew Cullison (London: Continuum, 2012): 124-141. 
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But, of course, (v) doesn’t (at least obviously) entail that S is (potentially or 
actually) aware of that which justifies her belief that p; it merely means that she 
doesn’t have a reason to doubt the reliability of p’s source. (Indeed, Bergmann adds 
this condition to PROPER FUNCTIONALISM.19) Hence, NO DEFEATERS is 
compatible with externalism. That is, NO DEFEATERS is neutral in respect to the 
internalism-externalism debate: all the SPO shows is that NO DEFEATERS must be 
included in the correct theory of justification, but NO DEFEATERS can be added to 
both internalist and externalist theories of justification. Therefore, the SPO doesn’t 
motivate internalism: the main motivation for internalism is not a motivation for it 
at all. So, if the SPO really is the main motivation for internalism, then internalism 
is in bad shape indeed. 
4. Objection: The SPO Does Motivate Internalism 
One might think that I have moved too quickly here: while NO DEFEATERS is 
neutral in respect to internalism and externalism, the SPO provides a way to link 
NO DEFEATERS to internalism. This is because in the SPO [a] entails [b] and [b] 
entails [c], and hence if S’s belief that p doesn’t meet internalist conditions for 
justification, then p will always appear accidentally true to S, and hence S will 
always have a defeater for p. Therefore, if NO DEFEATERS is part of an externalist 
theory of justification, S will never satisfy it20 and hence will never be justified by 
externalist standards. So, the only way to be a realist about justification, to hold 
that we are actually justified in some of our beliefs, is to assume that internalist 
conditions for justification are met.21 Call this THE ARGUMENT. We my put it as 
follows: 
1) If [a] the subject holding a belief isn’t aware of what that belief has 
going for it, then [b] she isn’t aware of how its status is any different 
from a stray hunch or an arbitrary conviction. (from the SPO) 
2) If [b] S isn’t aware of how its status is any different from a stray hunch 
or arbitrary conviction, then [c] from her perspective it is an accident 
that her belief is true.22 (from the SPO) 
3) Therefore, if [a] the subject holding a belief isn’t aware of what that 
belief has going for it, then [c] from her perspective it is an accident that 
                                                        
19 More precisely, he adds a no believed defeaters condition (Bergmann, Justification, 163-168). 
20 Here, I am supposing that internalist conditions for justification are not met; only externalist 
conditions are. 
21 This is interesting since externalism is usually cited as preserving commonsense views about 
justification. 
22 For ease of read, I have slightly modified [b] and [c]. 
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her belief is true. (from (1) and (2)) 
4) If a belief doesn’t meet internalist conditions for justification, then [a]. 
(from the definition of internalism) 
5) Therefore, if a belief doesn’t meet internalist conditions for justification, 
then [c]. (from (3) and (4)) 
6) If [c], then the belief has a defeater and is not justified. (from 
ACCIDENT and NO DEFEATERS) 
7) Therefore, any belief that doesn’t satisfy internalist conditions for 
justification is not justified. (from (5) and (6)) 
The upshot of THE ARGUMENT is that even if the externalist adds NO 
DEFEATERS to her criteria of justification, she will never be able to satisfy it; that 
is, if S is not aware of that which justifies her belief that p (i.e. if she doesn’t satisfy 
internalist conditions for justification), then, per the SPO, she will never satisfy NO 
DEFEATERS and hence will never have pure externalist justification.23 Therefore, 
since the SPO rules out (pure) externalist justification ever obtaining, it motivates 
internalism.  
4.1 Response: THE ARGUMENT is Unsound 
No doubt THE ARGUMENT, if sound, shows that the SPO supports internalism. 
However, I will show that both premises (1) and (2) of THE ARGUMENT are false.  
The fundamental problem with premise (1) is that it only takes into account 
awareness of positive aspects of beliefs. While the externalist holds that S can be 
justified even if she is not aware of its positive aspects and their relevance to her 
belief, she―if she endorses NO DEFEATERS―will also hold that S is not justified if 
her belief has a(n undefeated) defeater. If a belief of S’s has a defeater, then S can 
recognize that it does and distinguish it from other, undefeated beliefs. This means 
that S can recognize that arbitrary convictions or stray hunches are epistemically 
bad and have defeaters, and this enables her to distinguish them from other beliefs 
of hers that do not have defeaters. So, if S’s belief that p meets the externalist 
conditions for justification and NO DEFEATERS, then she will be able to 
distinguish p from another belief p* that has a defeater (e.g. because it is a ‘stray 
hunch’ or ‘arbitrary conviction’). In other words, S can distinguish defeated beliefs 
(e.g. a stray hunch) from undefeated beliefs, and hence premise (1) is false. 
                                                        
23 By “pure externalist justification” I mean justification that results from purely externalist 
conditions, such as PROPER FUNCTIONALISM. 
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Crucially, p appearing accidentally true from S’s perspective is a 
psychological property; therefore, in considering whether premise (2) is true, we 
need to know whether [b] necessitates a certain psychological property. [b], in 
essence, states that any belief of S’s that is in the epistemic class of hunches and 
arbitrary convictions will have the psychological property of appearing accidental 
from her perspective. However, once we recognize this, premise (2) seems highly 
dubious. Consider a ‘stray hunch.’ One might have a stray hunch that X is true, and 
when she finds out it’s true, she will say “I knew it! I told you so!,” in which case 
the truth of X didn’t appear accidental to S.24 (More generally, it is dubious to 
suppose the psychological state appearing accidental to S is necessarily connected 
with S’s belief being akin to a stray hunch.) So the truth of a stray hunch need not 
(necessarily) appear accidental to S. But perhaps I have overlooked the fact that it 
is a stray hunch: one might claim that to have a stray hunch just is for one to have 
a hunch that, after turning out true, appears accidental to its subject. If that is how 
we are to read [b], then the objector is correct. However, if we read [b] that way, 
then [c] reduces to [b]. Since [c], on this interpretation, is just a restatement of [b], 
premise (2) is superfluous, and we are left with only the inference from [a] to [b] in 
premise (1), which we have already seen is false. So, either premise (2) is false, or it 
reduces to premise (1) which is false. Either way, THE ARGUMENT is unsound.  
The upshot of this section is that the SPO is fundamentally flawed. Hence, 
even if the SPO entailed internalism, it would not help internalists since it relies 
on false premises. 
5. Why do so Many Think the SPO is Plausible? 
The reason the SPO strikes many as being so plausible, I contend, is that the 
examples that are usually given to motivate it make use of cognitive faculties that 
humans are predisposed to regard as dubious. Thus, the deck has been rigged 
against externalism. The formula of the SPO is this:  
FORMULA: (i) S has cognitive faculty F, (ii) S forms a belief by way of F, (iii) F 
reliably produces true beliefs, and (iv) S has no way of confirming (or never has 
confirmed) (iii). 
Typically, condition (i) of FORMULA refers to a F that humans don’t have.25 
It is then argued that in FORMULA externalist conditions of justification are met, 
                                                        
24 This is because we don’t claim to know things that appear accidentally true. Instead, we might 
say “that was lucky.” 
25 Norman is a clairvoyant (Bonjour, The Structure), Mr. Truetemp has a temperature faculty 
(Lehrer, “Proper Function”), Mr. Truenorth has a faculty that produces beliefs about what 
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but S’s belief produced by F isn’t justified since it is, in some sense, bizarre. And 
hence externalism is false. However, we can fill out FORMULA in a way that 
doesn’t undermine externalism. Consider: 
NORMA: Norma is a regular human being that is dropped off into the wild by 
her parents when she is a baby. By divine provision, she grows up into adulthood 
without encountering another living creature. On her 18th birthday, a group of 
hikers stumble upon Norma. Upon seeing them, her ‘theory of mind’26 produces 
various beliefs about their (the hiker’s) mental states (e.g. that thing looks 
concerned, that thing is trying to communicate with me, etc.). She is unaware she 
has a theory of mind, has never tested it or used it before, and doesn’t know the 
typical cognitive faculties that her species has.  
I suspect that many will be inclined to attribute Norma justification. But, 
like NORMAN (Mr. Truetemp, etc.), NORMA is just a filled out version of 
FORMULA. This shows us that whether FORMULA supports the SPO is contingent 
on what faculty is instantiated in F: if F isn’t a faculty a normal human possesses, it 
(may) elicit(s) the intuition that S lacks justification. However, if F is a normal 
human faculty, then it (may) elicit(s) the intuition that S is justified. This shows us 
that what’s doing work in the SPO is not the fact that externalist conditions are 
met, but that the faculty that produces the belief in question isn’t typically had by 
human beings. So, to hold that these cases support the SPO is to affirm a form of 
justificatory imperialism: it entails that beliefs produced by cognitive faculties that 
are not had by humans do not have justification. The grounding of the SPO, 
therefore, appears to be in a prejudice against non-human-like cognitive faculties. 
So, those who are dubious about such a human-centered view of justification have 
further reason to reject the SPO.27 
                                                                                                                      
direction one is facing (Russell, “The Problem”), and so on. 
26 Theory of mind is a cognitive faculty responsible for producing beliefs about the mental states 
of other creatures. See e.g. chapter 1 of Justin Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? 
(Maryland: AltaMira Press, 2004), chapters 1-3 of Justin Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and 
Theology: From Human Minds to Divine Minds. (Pennsylvania: Templeton Press, 2011), and 
Justin Barrett, Born Believers: The Science of Children’s Religious Belief. (New York: Free Press, 
2012), N. Knight, P. Sousa, J. Barrett, and S. Atran, “Children’s attributions of beliefs to humans 
and God,” Cognitive Science 28 (2004): 117-126, R.A. Richert and P.L. Harris, “Dualism revisited: 
Body vs. mind vs. soul,” Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (2008): 99-115, and Adam Waytz, 
Kurt Gray, Nicholas Epley, and Daniel M. Wegner "Causes and consequences of mind 
perception," Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (2010): 383-388. 
27 For comments on this article, thanks to Michael Bergmann. And thanks especially to 
G.L.G.―Colin Patrick Mitchell―for particularly insightful comments. 
